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cumstances of the parties justify or demand further or other liability.5
If a contract be entered into for a direct benefit of a third person, not
a party thereto, such third person may sue for breach thereof.6 The
test is whether the benefit to the third person is direct to him or is
but an incidental benefit to him arising from the contract.7 If direct, he
may sue on the contract; if incidental, he has no right of recovery.8
In an indemnity contract, the damages necessary for recovery need
not be restricted to damages awarded by a court for liability or damages
incurred by the violations of a legal right in property.9 Here, apparently,
there was no negligence or other breach of duty by the city or appellee
as against the appellant. It is not essential to the right of creditor or
donee beneficiary of a contract to recover thereon that he be identified
when the contract containing the promise is made.' 0
The instant case, allowing the parties to a contract the capacity to
bestow a right on a third person, is in accordance with the weight of
authority.11
CONTRACTS
MEANING OF "PROFITS"
Appellant suited for retirement benefits under the respondent cor-
poration's pension plan which provided that, "No pension or gratuity
of the third party beneficiary doctrine. (1) The agency theory
makes the promisee the agent of the beneficiary, but this is fictional
since the beneficiary does not make the promisee his agent. Gardner
v. Denison, 217 Mass. 492, 105 N.E. 359, 51 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1108
(1914); Williston, Contracts (1920), §352; Anson, Contracts (1930),
§277, 283. (2) Another theory finds a trust in a third party
beneficiary contract; but this is weak, since there is no holding of
legal title by a trustee. Seaver v. Ransom et al., 224 N.Y. 233, 120
N.E. 639 (1918); O'Hara et al. v. Dudley et al., 95 N.Y. 403 (1884);
Anson, Contracts (1930), §277, 283a, 285. (3) Another theory
allows the third party to recover on the basis of quasi-contract, but
this theory breaks down because there is no unjust enrichment.
Anson, Contracts (1930), 295. (4) The equitable asset theory holds
that the promisee is the debtor of the beneficiary and hence makes
a contract for his benefit, and this becomes an equitable asset of
the beneficiary; however, this could apply only in the case of a
third party creditor beneficiary and not in the case of a donee
beneficiary. National Bank v. Grand Lodge, 98 U.S. 123 (1878);
Hall v. Marston, 17 Mass. 575 (1822); Anson Contracts, §286. (5)
One theory speaks of the third party's recovery as an equitable
remedy, but this does not explain antecedent rights and duties.
Smith et al. v. Thompson et al., 250 Mich. 302, 230 N.W. 156, 73
A.L.R. 1389, 1395 (1930). The theory of the instant case is immune
from all of the above-mentioned objections.
5. Hageman v. Holmes, 179 Ill. 275, 53 N.E. 739 (1899).
6. Kinnan v. Hurst Co., 317 Ill. 251, 148 N.E. 12 (1925).
7. Vial v. Norwich Union Fire Ins. Society, 257 Ill. 355, 100 N.E. 929,
44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 317 (1913).
8. Searles v. City of Flora, 225 Ill. 167, 80 N.E. 98 (1906).
9. 27 Am. Jur., Indemnity, sec 20.
10. La Mourea v. Rhude, 209 Minn. 53, 259 N.W. 304, 306 (1940).
11. Carson Pirie Scott & Company v. W. J. Parrett et al., 346 Ill. 252
178 N.E. 498, 81 A.L.R. 1262, 1271 (1931).
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shall be paid except out of the profits of the company and no pension
or gratuity or claim thereto shall be a charge upon or against or pay-
able out of any of the capital assets of the company." The defense was:
first, that there were no profits, as depreciation on operating facilities
was properly chargeable as an expense before profits were realized;
second, that an item on the respondent's books, "Reserve for Pensions
and Benefits" was only an estimate of contingent liability and not a
segregation of assets constituting a trust fund. Held, the court found
the meaning of the word "profits" in the contract to be plain and un-
ambiguous, interpreting it to be net income less items of expense; in-
cluding an allowance for depreciation of assets as an expense. There
was no evidence to sustain the appellant's contention that the "Reserve
for Pensions and Benefits" was a segregation of assets representing a
trust fund. Gearns v. Commercial Cable Co., 293 N.Y. 105, 56 N.E. (2d)
67 (1944), affirming 266 App. Div. 315, 42 N.Y.S. (2d) 81 (1943); motion
for reargument denied, 293 N.Y. 755, 56 N.E. (2d) 749 (1944).
If the meaning of the contract is clear, the effect will not be con-
trolled by an erroneous construction given to it by the parties.1 Profits
are defined by the courts in a general manner to be the excess of receipts
over expenditures. 2 Where statutes provide for taxes on the profits of
municipal utilities, the term "profits" has usually been construed to in-
clude an allowance for depreciation as an expense. 3 In contracts be-
tween master and servant providing for salary and sharing of profits,
the courts have interpreted profits to include depreciation as an expense
so that payments will not be made out of the capital assets of the com-
pany.4 Dividends, of course, can only be paid out of the profits of a
corporation, and the stockholders are liable to creditors in the event
dividend payments are made without first allowing for depreciation to
1. Gardner v. Caylor, 24 Ind. App. 521, 56 N.E. 134 (1900).
2. Providence Rubber Company v. Goodyear, 9 Wall. 788, 804 (U.S.
1869); see Bates v. Porter, 74 Cal. 224, 15 Pac. 732 (1887); Curry v.
Charles Warner Company, 2 Marv. 98 (Del.), 42 Atl. 425 (1895).
3. City of Norfolk v. Board of Supervisors of Nansemond County, 168
Va. 606, 192 S.E. 588 (1937); People ex Rel Binghamton Light,
Heat, and Power Company v. Stevens, 204 N.Y. 22, 23, 25, 96 N.E.
114, 118, 119 (1911); People ex Rel Jaimaica Water Supply Com-
pany v. Board of Tax Commissioners, 196 N.Y. 39, 57, 58, 89 N.E.
581, 586, 587 (1909). But cf. Mr. Justice Spratley, dissenting in
City of Norfolk v. Board of Supervisors of Nansemond County,
supra at 636, 192 S.E. at 601, ". . . in determining profits. . . If,
in addition to current repairs and maintenance, an allowance is
made for the replacement of original parts, and the plant kept in
its original condition of usefulness, it is apparent no additional sum
should be allowed for general depreciation."
4. Swaney v. Derragon, 281 Mich. 142, 143, 274 N.W. 741 (1937),
"Profits are defined as the net gain made from an investment or
from the prosecution of some business after payment of all ex-
pense incurred, and the term is not to be confused with earnings
or receipts which deal only with income and not with operating
costs, fixed charges, overhead, depreciation, or expenses." Indiana
Veneer and Lumber Company v. Hageman, 57 Ind. App. 668, 105
N.E. 253 (1915); Arthur Jordan Company v. Caylor, 36 Ind. App.
640, 76 N.E. 419 (1905); E. B. Hartwell v. E. A. Becker, 181 Mo.
App. 408, 168 S.W. 837 (1914); Of. W. E. Jones v. W. F. Davidson,
2 Sneed 448 (Tenn. 1854).
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replace capital assets.5 In businesses, such as temporary exhibitions,
where the initial investment is not intended to be replaced, obviously,
depreciation is not allowable as an expense to ascertain the profits.6
The courts have followed a logically consistent pattern in defining
the word "profits" to include the expense of depreciation, since profits
are produced by capital and if no allowance was made for the replace-
ment of capital then profits could no longer be accumulated. In the
instant case, the contract itself is al obligation and therefore an expense,
but the word "profit" is used to make the pension expense one of
contingent liability; a type of unsecured claim.
CRIMINAL LAW
THE PROBLEM OF SIMILAR OFFENSES
L., a sales department manager, feloniously took goods from his
own and other departments and removed them, during and after store
hours, from the establishment where he was employed. He had no
authority to remove goods from the premises without procuring a
requisition. L. delivered the goods to G., who knew that they had not
been legally obtained. G. subsequently sold them, sharing proceeds
with L. Charged with grand larceny, L. pleaded guilty. G. was later
tried and convicted for receiving stolen goods. Motion for new trial
on grounds that verdict was contrary to law and not sustained by
sufficient evidence overruled. Ruling assigned as error. Conviction,
reversed: Statute' defines distinct offenses of feloniously receiving
stolen goods and feloniously receiving embezzled goods. Where affi-
davit charged receipt of stolen goods and evidence showed receipt of
embezzled goods, the variance requires reversal. Gentry v. State,
Ind.- , 61 N.E. (2d) 641 (1945).
This case presents the anomalous situation of a defendant charged
with and convicted of receiving stolen goods from a person who plead
5. Bank of Morgan v. Reid, 27 Ga. App. 123, 107 S.E. 555 (1921);
Fricke v. Angemeier, 53 Ind. App. 140, 101 N.E. 329 (1913); Burk
v. Ottawa Gas and Elec., Company, 87 Kan. 6, 123 Pac. 857 (1912).
But see Guaranty Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Grand Rapids G. H. and M.
Ry Co., 7 F. Supp. 511, 520 (W.D. Mich. 1931).
6. Eyster v. Centennial Board of Finance, 94 U.S. 500 (1876).
1. Ind. Stat. Anno. (Burns' 1933) § 10-3097: "Receiving Stolen
Goods. Whoever buys, receives, conceals, or aids in the concealing
of, anything of value, which has been stolen, taken by robbers,
embezzled, or obtained by false pretenses, knowing the same to
have been stolen, taken by robbers, embezzled, or obtained by
false pretenses, shall, . . . "
The problem presented in the principal case would not arise
in any of the states cited in the Burns' list of comparative legis-
lation. Under a similar statute, the Ohio court has held aver-
ment of the character of the offense by which the property was
originally wrongfully obtained unnecessary. Whiting v. State,
48. O.S. 220 (1891). The other legislation is not strictly parallel:
Idaho has a separate statute defining receipt of embezzled goods;
Illinois and Oregon classify embezzlement as larceny and goods
obtained by embezzlement are "stolen"; California and New York
have theft legislation and the property would be "stolen" regard-
less of the species of theft involved.
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